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vFOREWORD
This manuscript focuses on the present threat 
posed by terrorist and insurgent use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as the associated future 
threat potentials identified. The work presents a coun-
terintuitive analysis in the sense that armed drones 
are typically viewed as a component of America’s 
conventional warfighting prowess—not a technology 
that would be used against U.S. troops deployed over-
seas or against civilians back home. Utilizing a red 
teaming approach, the author, Dr. Robert J. Bunker, a 
past Minerva Chair at our institution, investigates the 
emerging threat of such UAV use. His unique analy-
sis and creative approach, especially when related to 
the threat scenario variants generated, make for very 
informative reading.
The work is divided into an introduction to the 
topical area, a UAV historical overview and discus-
sion of present use by the U.S. military, a chronologi-
cal narrative of terrorist and insurgent UAV use (and 
attempted use) from 1994 through 2015, the ensuing 
baselines and trending identified, and the foreseen po-
tentials derived from these trends—based upon tacti-
cal, operational, and strategic influencing scenarios, 
and the resulting military implications and suggested 
policy responses this will entail. The analysis not only 
has immediate value for Army force protection and 
counterterrorism programs, but also for research be-
ing conducted on projected robot-on-human force-on-
force engagements in insurgency type environments, 
as well as strategic considerations related to emerging 
“drone swarm” concepts and the changing character 
of warfare as robot Landpower technologies evolve 
and are increasingly fielded. 
The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that the anal-
ysis and recommendations found in this monograph 
will be of use to the various U.S. Army organizations 
impacted by nonstate threat UAV use and those enti-
ties in sister services also so effected, as well as domes-
tic policing and federal law enforcement bodies tasked 
with counterterrorism and homeland security mis-
sions. Further, other Army and sister service entities, 
as well as various U.S policymaking bodies, hopefully 
will find the larger implications posed by this report 
related to semi-autonomous and autonomous UAV 
type robotic systems of some benefit.
  
   
   DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
   Director
   Strategic Studies Institute and
       U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Derived from the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
use threat scenarios, three levels of military signifi-
cance are foreseen with terrorist and insurgent ac-
tivities associated with these devices. Because of the 
technologies that will eventually be associated with 
UAVs—robotics and expert (and artificial intelligence) 
systems networked together—their significance is pro-
jected as increasing over time from the tactical to the 
operational and then to the strategic levels of concern. 
These levels of military implication and the suggested 
policy responses related to them are: 
Tactical.
The impact of even singular terrorist UAV use at 
this level is viewed as an immediate- and near-term 
problem. It may represent more of a domestic security 
issue than an overseas basing or deployment threat—
although such weaponized devices could just as eas-
ily be utilized for terrorism purposes overseas against 
service personnel and their families as they could be 
used against civilians in the United States. The tactical 
level threat derived from the drone-up shooting, im-
provised explosive device (IED) crowd targeting, and 
aircraft takedown scenario variants will be of concern 
to domestic law enforcement, homeland security, and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task 
Force elements as well as the military. 
Operational.
This level of impact is insurgency environment 
focused and pertains to the use of groups of human 
controlled and semi-autonomous UAVs. The virtual 
martyrs and drone squadron scenario variants por-
trayed the various types of flying IED, weapons plat-
form, and human insurgent fighter combined arms’ 
hybrid threats that could be encountered at this level 
of concern. While conceivably representing a pres-
ent-day operational risk scenario as the technologies 
exist for insurgents to utilize UAVs in this way, this 
is much more likely a near futures issue that could 
still be some years out on the horizon before non-
state opposing forces even contemplate or attempt 
such attacks. 
Since no terrorism component is readily foreseen 
but rather force-on-force engagements are being fo-
cused upon, this is not viewed as a domestic law en-
forcement and homeland security concern. Rather, 
it is an Army and allied services expeditionary con-
cern bridging the tactical into the operational level 
of impact. 
Strategic.
While the drone swarms of normal and micro-
sized UAVs projected in this threat scenario may still 
be a few decades out and possibly even beyond the 
capacity of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on 
their own without state sponsorship, now is the time 
to attempt to get ahead of such developments and 
help shape the future combat environment. At a mini-
mum, we may presently be in an inter-war period, as 
experienced between World Wars I and II, when the 
various elements leading to a Revolution in Military 
Affairs took place with the evolution of the tank and 
supporting arms that resulted in the mass armor and 
mechanized formations that fought in World War II. 
x
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In this instance, similar disparate elements, involv-
ing robotics, expert systems, artificial and collective 
(cloud-like based) intelligence, network communica-
tions, and 3rd and 4th dimension (3D and 4D) repli-
cators may be ushering in another revolution in land 
warfare involving both ground and aerial based un-
manned vehicles and systems. 
UAVs have increasingly been in the news as the 
cost of these systems continues to drop and their pop-
ularity increases. A few million of these systems are 
now said to exist globally, with the numbers rapidly 
increasing. Recent stories highlighting UAVs have 
caused quite a bit of sensationalism and have been 
focused on increasing concerns over their terrorism 
potentials. Interestingly, serious concerns over terror-
ist use of UAVs, and later insurgent use of UAVs (that 
includes terrorism as an insurgent tactic), have existed 
for roughly over a decade, but such concerns had not 
been widely disseminated by the media until recently.
The U.S. Army and the rest of the U.S. governmen-
tal defense community have a vested interest in better 
understanding this area of threat concerns and poten-
tials. While terrorist and insurgent use (and projected 
use) of UAVs is important for its homeland defense 
and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) impli-
cations, it is also—and quite possibly more important-
ly—likely to have great influence on the conduct of 
future forms of conventional warfighting. The reason 
for this contention is because, ultimately, UAVs repre-
sent artifacts belonging to the ongoing informational 
and robotics revolutions that have been taking place 
for decades. The significance of advances in informa-
tion systems and robotics and what this will mean to 
future warfighting have not been lost on the Strategic 
Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College or on 
other U.S. defense policy institutions.
With these thoughts in mind, this monograph 
will provide context related to a short UAV historical 
overview and their present use by the U.S. military, a 
section on terrorist and insurgent use (and attempted 
use) of UAVs, UAV baselines and trending analysis, 
potentials based on projected UAV threat scenarios, 
what this may mean in terms of U.S. military implica-
tions, and finally suggested forms of policy response 
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 
The first military use of UAVs dates back to World 
War I when early tests were carried out—one in 1917 
by the United Kingdom (UK) involved a radio-con-
trolled Sopwith Camel biplane loaded with dynamite. 
In World War II, about 15,000 UAVs were built in 
one Southern California plant alone for anti-aircraft 
targeting purposes. U.S. military interest and use of 
UAVs waxed and waned during the Cold War. UAV 
use then drastically increased due to Section 220 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2001 (from 
2000) which mandated the fielding of unmanned air 
and ground vehicles, combined with the September 
11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Towers and the 
Pentagon, resulting in the use of armed drones in in-
creasing numbers in the global war against al-Qaida. 
Terrorist and insurgent use (and attempted use) of 
UAVs spans the 1994 Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attempt 
to use weaponized drones through the 2015 Islamic 
State (IS) use of these craft for reconnaissance and pro-
paganda video purposes. Such groups are still very 
much in an experimental phase of using these craft 
and possess relatively few of them, and—when they 
do have them in their inventories—they tend to be 
inferior commercial models (as opposed to military 
grade UAVs). Still, their use by terrorist and insur-
gent groups is increasing, as are the capabilities of 
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the systems being deployed. During that time span, 
al-Qaida, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia—People’s Army, Fatah, Hizbollah, Lashkar-
e-Taiba, and Hamas have all been involved in actual 
or attempted UAV use. The purpose of this use has 
included reconnaissance and surveillance, mes-
saging, IED delivery, weapons of mass destruction 
delivery, and as a weapons platform. Other UAV 
capabilities that exist—yet have not been tied to ter-
rorist or insurgent use so far—are smuggling, limited 
electronic intelligence capability, logistical resupply, 
and surrender of opposing force personnel. Recent 
technology trends that may influence future nonstate 
threat potentials are smart glasses and virtual reality 
goggles, apps and modular payloads, expert systems 
and artificial intelligence, and three-dimensional (3D) 
printing.
Transitioning from present baselines of terror-
ist and insurgent use of UAVs, along with technol-
ogy trends influencing their potential uses, three red 
teaming threat scenarios have been created for early 
warning purposes: 1) Single UAV—human controlled 
with drone-up shooting (like a walk-up shooting), 
IED crowd targets, and aircraft takedown variants, 2) 
Groups of UAVs—human controlled or semi-autono-
mous with squad-sized virtual martyr units and semi-
autonomous drone squadron variants; and 3) Swarms 
of UAVs—considered as autonomous to highlight the 
projected evolution of this weaponry use with drone 
swarm and micro-drone swarm variants. 
These three threat scenarios result in three corre-
sponding levels of impact found at the tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic levels of military significance. For 
the U.S. Army, the tactical implications of such UAV 
use will fall within force protection, counterterrorism, 
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and defense support of civil authorities’ missions. It 
will focus on UAV detection, countermeasures, and 
tactical response and is an immediate concern. The 
operational level of impact is insurgency environment 
focused and most likely a near futures issue. It pertains 
to the use of groups of human controlled and semi-
autonomous UAVs and represents an expeditionary 
concern bridging the tactical into the operational level 
of impact. This means that experimentation and red 
teaming is warranted related to threat forces’ use of 
UAVs in insurgency type environments. The strategic 
level of concern, on the other hand, may still be a few 
decades out, and possibly even beyond the capacity 
of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on their own 
without state sponsorship. Still, its autonomous and 
semi-sentient drone swarm potentials are viewed as 
having an immense impact on the future conduct of 
war. Considerations need to be made concerning arms 
control regimes related to such autonomous, intelli-
gent, and lethal robotic systems as well as their inte-
gration with human soldiers into future force struc-
tures, if that Army unit composition is elected to be 
followed—which presently appears to be the national 
trajectory.
1TERRORIST AND INSURGENT UNMANNED 
AERIAL VEHICLES: USE, POTENTIALS, AND 
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sometimes 
called simply “drones,” have increasingly been in the 
news as the cost of these systems continues to drop 
and their popularity increases.1 At present, a few mil-
lion of these systems are said to exist globally, with the 
numbers rapidly increasing.2 Recent stories highlight-
ing UAVs have caused quite a bit of sensationalism 
and have been focused on increasing concerns over 
their terrorism potentials. Such stories have included:
•  In London, a December 2014 governmental con-
firmation of an earlier incident of a UAV almost 
hitting an airliner at Heathrow Airport fol-
lowed by ongoing illegal drone flights over city 
landmarks and sports stadiums in 2015.3 These 
incidents have increasingly sensitized the pub-
lic and officials to drone terrorism threat poten-
tials—even including those to United Kingdom 
(UK) nuclear plants.4
•  A small quadcopter that penetrated Secret Ser-
vice security and crash-landed on the White 
House lawn on January 27, 2015. It turns out 
the UAV was being flown for recreational pur-
poses by a U.S. Government employee around 
midnight who said that he lost control of the 
device (known as a flyaway).5
•  Mystery UAVs flying over Paris in late-Febru-
ary and early-March 2015 then created a mini-
hysteria in a city already on edge from the ear-
lier mid-January Charlie Hebdo, supermarket, 
and printing firm gun battles involving radical 
Islamist terrorists proclaiming allegiance to 
2al-Qaida and the Islamic State (IS).6 While the 
UAV intrusions were shown to have no ter-
rorism links, the psychic damage had already 
been done—much of the French public now re-
alize that terrorists could use drones for future 
attacks.
Interestingly, serious concerns over terrorist use 
of UAVs, and later insurgent use of UAVs (that in-
cludes terrorism as an insurgent tactic), have existed 
for roughly over a decade but such concerns had not 
been widely disseminated by the media until recent-
ly.7 The U.S. Army and the rest of the U.S. governmen-
tal defense community have a vested interest in better 
understanding this area of threat concerns and poten-
tials—not because they have now been sensationalized 
but because of the underlying early warning patterns 
that they have been generating for some time. 
While terrorist and insurgent use (and projected 
use) of UAVs is important for the Army’s home-
land defense and defense support of civil authorities 
(DSCA) implications, it is also—and quite possibly 
more importantly—likely to have great influence on 
the conduct of future forms of conventional warf-
ighting. The reason this contention is being made is 
because ultimately UAVs represent artifacts belong-
ing to the ongoing informational and robotics revolu-
tions that have been taking place for decades.8 Such 
artifacts, when utilized for conflict and war, are, of 
course, not only being employed by violent nonstate 
actors but also by sovereign states. States, indeed, 
have almost totally monopolized this combat capabil-
ity until quite recently. In fact, the United States and 
its allies have been without peer in their utilization of 
UAVs since September 11, 2001 (9/11), to target and 
3engage a number of the terrorist and insurgent groups 
identified in this monograph and even, at times, us-
ing UAVs against targets associated with the sover-
eign states which sometimes harbor these terrorists or 
insurgents. 
The significance of advances in information sys-
tems and robotics and what this will mean to future 
warfighting have not been lost on the Strategic Stud-
ies Institute of the U.S. Army War College or on other 
U.S. defense policy institutions.9 In December 2015, 
Dr. Steven Metz wrote a short yet prescient essay 
about the coming Landpower robot revolution and 
provided five questions related to its first phase based 
on early innovation and experimentation: 
1. What is the appropriate mix of humans and 
robots?
2. How autonomous should the robots be?
3. What type of people will be needed for robot 
heavy Landpower formations?
4. What effect will robot centric Landpower have 
on American national security policy?
5. What to do about enemy robots?10
This monograph addresses some of Metz’s ques-
tions in the areas of projected enemy (terrorist and 
insurgent) UAV (robot) capabilities and their level of 
autonomy. Also, some mention of envisioned threat 
forces of mixed humans and robots will be high-
lighted. While this discussion will not specifically 
provide guidance related to future American robot 
Landpower, it may help to provide some analytical 
preconditions for such an effort. With these thoughts 
in mind, this monograph will provide context related 
to a short UAV overview and their present use by the 
U.S. military, a section on terrorist and insurgent use 
4(and attempted use) of UAVs, UAV baselines and 
trending analysis, potentials based on projected UAV 
threat scenarios, what this may mean in terms of U.S. 
military implications, and finally suggested forms 
of policy response at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels. 
UAV OVERVIEW 
PRESENT U.S. MILITARY USE
The first military use of UAVs dates back to World 
War I when early tests were carried out—one test in 
1917 by the UK involved taking a radio-controlled 
Sopwith Camel biplane loaded with dynamite to see 
if it could be made to ram into one of the German zep-
pelins, the craft that were then bombing British cities. 
The demonstration had to be scrapped due to radio 
command and control failures which almost resulted 
in a group of gathered generals on the ground being 
killed by what had then become a rogue UAV div-
ing towards them.11 Testing continued on and off by 
the United States, the UK, and others over the ensu-
ing years with drone use for anti-aircraft targeting 
practice becoming common in the 1930s. 
In World War II, about 15,000 UAVs were built 
in one Southern California plant alone for such pur-
poses.12 Attempts at creating unmanned B-17 and 
B-24 bombers, which were conceptually based on the 
earlier World War I Kettering Bug concept—to dive 
into highly defended German military-industrial tar-
gets—were also attempted. These drones were beset 
with numerous issues—including the fact that they re-
quired human operators to get them airborne and arm 
their explosive charges prior to bailing out from the 
planes—and achieved very limited results. The Ger-
mans utilized drones in a different way, with 8,000 of 
5their infamous V-1 flying bombs being launched later 
in the war against Britain in an indiscriminate terror 
campaign.13 
U.S. military interest and use of UAVs waxed and 
waned during the Cold War. Reconnaissance drones 
were used in Southeast Asia, based on an initial 1962 
contract, with over 3,000 missions of the Fire Fly crafts 
flown. Then, between 1979-87, the failed Army Aquila 
project—which sought to create 780 drones that could 
relay operational level battlefield intelligence—result-
ed in only a few prototypes being produced at a cost 
of over $1 billion. One of the limited drone successes 
during this era can be attributed to Israel. In its 1982 
Bekaa Valley attack on Syrian air defenses (situated 
in Lebanon), an initial wave of UAVs triggered the 
system, which proceeded to fire its missiles at the de-
coy drones. While the Syrians were in the process of 
reloading their own missiles, a second wave of Israeli 
jets came in and fired their radar homing missiles, 
wiping out the Soviet derived air defense system.14
Until 9/11, U.S. military drone use existed at a low 
yet somewhat steady level, with some of the older Fire 
Fly (renamed Lightning Bug) units still in existence 
along with the newer RQ-2 Pioneer system fielded 
in 1986 and considered vital for battlefield recon-
naissance (and later targeting) missions by the vari-
ous services. Limited chaff and propaganda (leaflet) 
dropping missions also took place with some of these 
UAVs. Further, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
quietly became involved in influencing UAV fielding 
and use from the 1980s onward, with the emergence 
of their large Predator surveillance drone (and its ded-
icated satellite links) in 1994, which was deployed to 
the Balkans in the mid- and late-1990s.15
6Section 220 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act, FY 2001 (from 2000) established the following ini-
tial goal—then changed the equation:
(a) Goal.—It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to 
achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled 
technology such that—
 (1) by 2010, one-third of aircraft in the opera-
tional deep strike force aircraft fleet are unmanned; 
and,
 (2) by 2015, one-third of the operational ground 
combat vehicles are unmanned.16
When combined with the 9/11 attacks on the 
World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, these events 
not only resulted in a firebreak promoting future 
mandated UAV use by military forces but saw those 
systems, along with UAVs belonging to the CIA, used 
in increasing numbers in the global war against al-Qa-
ida. Prior to those dual events, only small numbers of 
UAVs (estimated at less than 50) were being utilized 
by the intelligence community and armed services. 
About a decade later, a 2012 Congressional Research 
Services (CRS) report entitled U.S. Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS) identified 7,494 Department of Defense 
(DoD) UAS platforms in the inventory.17 This number 
did not include CIA dedicated units, which conser-
vatively are estimated at 30 but could be somewhat 
higher.18 In the CRS report, UAVs now equal about 70 
percent of the manned U.S. aircraft inventory (which 
stands at 10,767) and are collectively engaged in all of 
the following DoD capabilities and missions:
• Anti-Submarine Warfare
• Anti-Surface Warfare
• Battle Management Command and Control
• Electronic Warfare
7• Explosive Ordnance Disposal
• Force Protection
• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
• Maritime Domain Awareness
• Mine Warfare (Naval)
• Organic Mine Countermeasures (Naval)
• Precision Strike
•  Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target  
Acquisition.19
As can be seen, the U.S. military is now heavily in-
vested in UAVs for numerous warfighting capabilities 
with over 70 years of learning experience associated 
with their fielding and use. Sovereign state militar-
ies—both allies and potential belligerents—increas-
ingly are now deploying these systems in an attempt 
to catch up to the superior U.S. capabilities in this 
technological area. In the following section on terror-
ist and insurgent use of UAVs, however, it can be seen 
that their fielding of these devices is much more of a 
haphazard and limited affair. These groups are still 
very much in an experimental phase of using these 
craft and possess relatively few of them, and—when 
they do have them in their inventories—they tend to 
be inferior commercial models (as opposed to military 
grade UAVs). Still, their drone use is now increasing 
as are the capabilities of the systems being deployed. 
Terrorist and Insurgent Use of UAVs.
The use, and attempted use, of UAVs by terror-
ists and insurgents can at least be dated back to the 
pre-June 1994 attempts by the Japanese apocalyptic 
cult Aum Shinrikyo to conduct dry runs to release 
the nerve agent sarin by means of remote controlled 
8helicopters with aerial spray systems.20 The attempts 
failed as the mini-helicopters crashed during testing, 
with that terrorist group going on to utilize different 
dispersal methods when they launched their sarin at-
tacks on a Matasumoto courthouse and later on the 
Tokyo subway system.21 The latter attack resulted in 
about a dozen people killed and 5,500 injured by this 
nerve agent. 
The next incident related to UAV threatened use 
was that of a pre-July 2001 improvised explosive de-
vice (IED) attack upon G8 Summit leaders (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the 
United States) in Genoa, Italy, by al-Qaida. This plot 
may have only entered the “what if” stage of concep-
tualization with Osama bin Laden musing about its 
potentials as discrepancies exist as to whether the plot 
was actually ever put into place.22 Two more al-Qaida 
based plots followed: one pre-February 2002 originat-
ing out of Pakistan, and the other in June 2002 from 
an unspecified location. The first plot tied to Mozzam 
Begg sought to launch a drone filled with anthrax 
against the English House of Commons. He was sent 
to Guantanamo Prison for his involvement but was 
later released from custody in January 2005 because 
the original charges became questionable.23 The sec-
ond plot revolved around IED-carrying remote con-
trolled planes being utilized against passenger air-
lines—though the plot was never said to get beyond 
the concept stage.24 
Then, in August 2002, a Colombian Army unit 
seized nine remote controlled planes from a camp 
deep in the jungle belonging to the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group. 
The intended use of these planes is unknown, but some 
speculation existed that they may have been intended 
to carry IEDs.25 This was followed by a Fatah Pales-
9tinian plot in December 2002 to conduct IED model 
airplane attacks on Jewish sections of Jerusalem. The 
plot, which was to involve hundreds of such model 
airplanes, never got beyond the flight test stage.26 
Three linked incidents in which UAVs were to be 
utilized for attack, reconnaissance, and protest pur-
poses subsequently took place. The initial one from 
August through December 2003 was a joint effort by a 
Hizbollah cell that was supporting the Al Aqsa Mar-
tyrs brigade, an arm of Fatah. The intent was to launch 
an IED UAV attack on Jewish settlers in Gaza, howev-
er, the plot was interdicted by Israeli security forces.27 
Then, on November 7, 2004, a Hizbollah drone was 
launched from southern Lebanon and engaged in a 
20-minute reconnaissance over Nahariya in northern 
Israel. The Mirsad-1 drone, provided by Iran, was of 
military grade quality with conflicting reports of its 
either crashing in the sea off the Lebanese coast or re-
turning back to its Hizbollah base after its reconnais-
sance flight.28 The final incident took place on April 
11, 2005, and involved another Mirsad-1 drone flown 
by Hizbollah from southern Lebanon. In this incident, 
the drone overflew the northern Israeli city of Acre 
as a protest of Israeli airspace violations of Lebanon, 
according to Hizbollah. The drone was able to com-
plete its mission successfully and return back to its 
Hizbollah base.29
Two Pakistani terrorist group linked incidents then 
took place on September 13-14, 2005. In the first, the 
Pakistani Army raided an al-Qaida hideout in North 
Waziristan. In the raid, they seized a Chinese made 
remote control model airplane which was said to be 
used for the reconnaissance of Pakistani security forces 
prior to attacking them. IED weaponization potentials 
of this model aircraft were also mentioned.30 The next 
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day, Ala Asad Chandia (Abu Qatada) was arrested in 
Fairfax County, VA, for obtaining an MP 1OOOSYS 
electronic automatic pilot system for model aircraft. 
This Lashkar-e-Taiba trained individual was federally 
indicted and subsequently convicted for attempting 
to send this technology to that terrorist group for its 
drone use in Pakistan.31
In what may or may not be considered a major esca-
lation of terrorist and insurgent drone capabilities, on 
August 13, 2006—during the Second Lebanon War—
three Ababil (military grade) Iranian drones supplied 
to Hizbollah were launched against Israel from south-
ern Lebanon. Each drone was said to be carrying a 40-
50 kilogram explosive warhead and was intended for 
use against a “strategic target,” according to Hizbol-
lah. The threat was taken seriously enough that F-16 
Israeli fighters shot down these UAVs near Tyre in 
Lebanon and near Haifa and Western Galilee in Israel. 
Upon inspecting the wreckage of some of these craft, 
Israel claimed that they were not carrying warheads.32
Between 2006 and May 2012, two al-Qaida inci-
dents and one Taliban UAV incident occurred. In Co-
lumbus, OH, during the 2006-07 period (exact dates 
unspecified), al-Qaida trained Christopher Paul was 
conducting drone research, utilizing a 5-foot-long 
model helicopter, for terrorism purposes. He was ar-
rested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 
August 2007 and was subsequently convicted in June 
2008 (he took a plea deal that resulted in a shorter sen-
tence).33 In the next incident, which took place on Sep-
tember 28, 2008, Rezwan Ferdaus—an al-Qaida affini-
ty adherent—was arrested by the FBI in Ashland, MA. 
He was caught in a terrorist sting operation related to 
his plot to drive F-86 Sabre and F-14 Phantom scale 
models (with Global Positioning System [GPS] capa-
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bility) loaded with C-4 explosives into the Pentagon 
and Capitol buildings. He was convicted for this plot 
in 2012 and also took a plea deal, like Paul, for shorter 
sentencing purposes.34 Finally, on May 19, 2012, an al-
lied raid on a Taliban base in Helmand Province, Af-
ghanistan, turned up a small drone—possibly a North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Desert Hawk—
along with some IEDs and small arms. The intended 
Taliban use of the drone was unknown, quite possi-
bly for reconnaissance purposes, though it appeared 
slightly damaged in a photo of the arms cache and no 
control unit was found along with it.35 
Four more escalatory Hizbollah and Hamas UAV 
incidents took place between the latter part of 2012 
and mid-2014. On October 6, 2012, Hizbollah sent an 
Iranian Ayoub drone over Dimona, Israel—a restrict-
ed area which contains that nation’s nuclear weapons 
facilities—for reconnaissance purposes. The timing of 
the drone incident coincided with Israeli military ex-
ercise preparations. Given the sensitivity of this area, 
the drone was shot down by an Israeli F-16, although 
not until after it had been aloft for some hours.36 An-
other Hizbollah drone, the type not specified, was 
then shot down by an F-16 10 kilometers out to sea 
west of Haifa on April 22, 2013. What mission this 
UAV was engaging in is unknown.37 A Hamas plot at 
a local university to send a UAV carrying explosives 
into Israel in October 2013 was then interdicted by the 
Palestinian Authority in Hebron.38 In the last of these 
incidents, on July 14, 2014, a homemade Hamas drone 
was shot down over Ashdod, Israel, by a patriot mis-
sile. This 5-foot-long drone was outfitted with small 
air-to-ground rockets (per unconfirmed Hamas video 
images) and was on its way to engage an undisclosed 
Israeli target.39 
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The Islamic State (IS) joined the nonstate threat 
drone proliferation club with three successful UAV 
operations in August and September 2014. The first 
incident was on August 23, 2014, near Raqqa province 
in northern Syria. It involved the use of a commercial 
system—a DJI Phantom FC40 quadcopter—to recon 
Syrian Army Base 93 prior to an IS ground assault on 
the base. The quadcopter video imagery was subse-
quently used in IS propaganda videos.40 On August 
30, 2014, an unspecified IS drone was used over Fal-
luja, Iraq, to provide imagery of attacks on the city for 
online propaganda purposes.41 In the last IS operation 
on September 12, 2014, in Kobani, northern Syria, an-
other unspecified drone was used to capture video 
imagery of suicide bomber and ground attacks on that 
city for propaganda purposes.42
Hizbollah then engaged in a successful drone 
strike operation against the al-Nusra Front—an al-
Qaida linked group—near Arsal in northeastern Leb-
anon on September 21, 2014. Twenty-three al-Nusra 
terrorists were said to be killed in this attack, which 
was followed up by a group assault—an incident that 
has now ushered in terrorist-on-terrorist group based 
drone warfare.43 Whether the drone utilized in the at-
tack carried an explosively tipped warhead or carried 
air-to-ground rockets (or missiles) is unknown.44 A 
final incident involving terrorist and insurgent use of 
UAVs occurred on around March 16, 2015, near the 
city of Fallujah, Iraq. In that incident, an IS militant 
flew a small model aircraft for about 20 minutes. After 
the drone landed, the IS operative placed the drone 
in the trunk of a car and proceeded to drive off, at 
which point U.S. coalition military forces launched an 
airstrike destroying the insurgent, the drone, and the 
vehicle.45 This incident and all of the earlier ones sum-
marized in this section can be viewed in Table 1.46
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ogy, June 2004, translated into English March 2005, available from 
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Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted  
Use of UAVs.
Date Location Perpetrator UAV Type Use Outcome 
Pre-June 1994 Japan Aum Shinrikyo
Remote 
Controlled 
Helicopters
Spray Chemical 
Agent (Sarin)
Crashed During 
Testing
Pre-July 2001 Genoa, Italy
Osama bin 
Laden, al-Qaida 
Leader
Remote 
Controlled  
Airplanes
IED Attack on G8 
Summit Leaders
Considered Only; 
Not Attempted
(Alleged)
Pre-February 
2002 Pakistan
Moazzam Begg, 
al-Qaida  
Operative
Drone
Launch Drone 
from Suffolk with 
Anthrax Against 
House of Com-
mons
Alleged Plot; Sent to 
Guantanamo Prison; 
Released in January 
2005
June 2002 Not Specified al-Qaida
Remote 
Controlled  
Airplanes
IED Attack on 
Passenger Airlin-
ers
Considered Only; 
Not Attempted
(Alleged)
August 2002  Colombia FARC
9 Remote 
Controlled  
Airplanes
Unknown; Pos-
sibly Weaponized 
(IED)
Recovered by Co-
lombian Army Unit 
from Remote Camp
December 2002 Jerusalem, Israel Fatah
Hundreds 
of Model 
Airplanes
IED Attacks on 
Jewish Sections 
of Jerusalem
Conducted Flight 
Tests Only
August and 
December 2003 Gaza, Palestine
Hizbollah Cell 
(Linked to Al 
Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades; Fatah)
UAV
IED Attack on 
Jewish Settlers in 
Gaza
Interdicted by Israeli 
Security Forces
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7 November 2004 Nahariya, Northern Israel Hizbollah
Iranian 
Mirsad-1 
Drone
20-Minute Recon-
naissance
Mission
Either a) Crashed 
in the Sea Near 
Lebanese Shore or 
b) Returned Back to 
Hizbollah Base
11 April 2005 Acre, Northern Israel Hizbollah
Iranian 
Mirsad-1 
Drone
Overflight of 
Israeli Communi-
ties (Stated as a 
Protest of Leba-
nese Airspace Vio-
lations)
Successful Opera-
tion; Returned Back 
to Hizbollah Base
13 September 
2005
North 
Waziristan, 
Pakistan
al-Qaida
Chinese 
Made Remote 
Control Model 
Airplane 
To Recon 
Pakistani Security 
Forces Prior to 
Attack; Also Wea-
ponized (IED)
Seized in Major Raid 
of al-Qaida Hide 
Out by the Pakistani 
Army
14 September 
2005
Fair Fax  
County, 
Virginia
Ala Asad Chandia 
(Abu Qatada); 
Lashkar-e- Taiba 
Trained
Obtained MP 
1OOOSYS—
Electronic Au-
tomatic Pilot 
System for 
Model Aircraft 
in April 2002
For Lashkar-e- 
Taiba Terrorist 
Group Drone Use 
in Pakistan
Indicted and Subse-
quently
Convicted 
13 August 2006
Near Tyre, 
Lebanon; Near 
Haifa, Israel; 
Western Gali-
lee, Israel
Hizbollah
3 Ababil 
Drones, Each 
With 40-50 
Kilogram 
Warhead
Against  
"Strategic Targets"
All 3 Shot Down by 
Israeli F-16s
2006-2007 Colombus, Ohio
Christopher Paul 
(al-Qaida trained)
5-Foot-Long 
Model Heli-
copter
Conducted Drone 
Research for Ter-
rorism Purposes
Arrested by FBI and 
Convicted (Plea in 
2008)
28 September 
2011
Ashland,
Massachusetts Rezwan Ferdaus (al-Qaida Affinity)
Scale Models 
of F-86 Sabre 
and F-14 
Phantom Jets 
(GPS capabil-
ity)
IED (C-4 Explo-
sive) Attack on 
Pentagon and 
Capitol Buildings
Arrested
By FBI and Convict-
ed (Plea in 2012); 
Sting Operation
19 May 2012
Helmand 
Province, 
Afghanistan
Taliban
Might be 
Recovered 
NATO UAS 
(Desert Hawk 
Drone)
Unknown Use - 
Possible Recon. 
Found with IED 
Materials and 
Small Arms
Captured in Raid
6 October 2012 Dimona, Israel Hizbollah IranianAyoub Drone
Recon of 
Israeli Nuclear 
Weapons Com-
plex & Military 
Exercise Prepara-
tion
Shot Down by Israeli 
F-16 Jet
Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted  
Use of UAVs. (cont.)
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22 April 2013
Over the Sea 
10 Kilometers 
West of Haifa, 
Israel
Hizbollah Unmanned 
Drone; Type 
Not Specified
Mission Unknown
Shot Down by Israeli 
F-16 Jet at an Alti-
tude of 6,000 Feet
October 2013 West Bank, Palestine Hamas
Plot Centered 
at Hebron 
University to 
Place Explo-
sives on UAV
Fly into Israel to 
Engage Unknown 
Target(s)
Palestinian Authority 
Arrested Plotters 
Prior to Launch
14 July 2014 Ashdod, Israel Hamas
5-Foot-Long 
Homemade 
Drone Aircraft 
with Small 
Rockets 
(Unconfirmed 
Hamas Video 
Image)
Fly into Israel to 
Engage Unknown 
Target(s)
Shot Down by Israeli 
Patriot Missile
23 August 2014
Near Raqqa 
Province, 
Northern Syria
Islamic State (IS)
DJI Phantom 
FC40  
Quadcopter
Recon of Syr-
ian Army Military 
Base 93 Prior to 
Ground Assault; 
Imagery Provided 
via IS Propaganda 
Video on YouTube
Successful  
Operation
30 August 2014 Falluja, Iraq Islamic State (IS) Unspecified Drone
Propaganda 
Purposes; Video 
of Attacks in the 
City
Successful  
Operation
12 September 
2014
Kobani,  
Northern Syria Islamic State (IS)
Unspecified 
Drone
Propaganda 
Purposes; Video 
Footage of Suicide 
and Ground  
Attacks
Successful  
Operation
21 September 
2014
Near Arsal, 
Northeastern 
Lebanon
Hizbollah Armed Drones
Killed 23 al-Nusra 
Front (al-Qaida 
Linked) Fighters at 
Base; Followed by 
Ground Assault
Successful  
Operation
Appx. 16 March 
2015
Near Fallujah, 
Iraq Islamic State (IS)
Unspecified 
Drone
Unknown; Pos-
sible Reconnais-
sance or Propa-
ganda Purposes
Operator and Drone 
Destroyed in Car by 
U.S. Coalition Air 
Strike
Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted  
Use of UAVs. (cont.)
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BASELINES AND TRENDING ANALYSIS
Derived from the overview of the historical and 
contemporary use (and attempted use in plots) of 
UAVs by terrorists and insurgents in the preceding 
section, the following capabilities gained by using this 
technology have been identified.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
Initially, the reconnaissance of fixed facilities and 
military units was gained by UAV deployment, as 
was evident with Hizbollah drone use in November 
2004 and October 2012 against Israel. Also, an al-Qa-
ida drone was seized in September 2005 in Pakistan 
which would be used prior to launching an attack 
(possible use) as was a Taliban drone seized in May 
2012 in Afghanistan (possible use). An IS drone was 
also used in a reconnaissance role as recently as Au-
gust 2014 against a Syrian army base in northern Syria 
prior to a ground assault upon it. The use of drones for 
real time surveillance appears to be a far less common 
UAV occurrence for violent nonstate actors, although 
real time drone imagery of IS attacks on Falluja, Iraq, 
in August 2014 and Kobani, Syria, in September 2014 
used for propaganda purposes could conceivably also 
be used for command, control, and coordination pur-
poses—but, in those examples, this was probably not 
exploited.47 
Messaging.
Various forms of messaging (communicating in-
formation to others) exist related to UAV use. At the 
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most basic level, this can take the form of making a 
protest. It was thought that the April 2005 Hizbollah 
use of a drone to overfly Israeli communities was pri-
marily meant to signal that an earlier Israeli violation 
of Hizbollah airspace in southern Lebanon would not 
be tolerated.48 Another form of messaging is that of 
propaganda. Propaganda can be directed at both in-
ternal and external audiences in terms of drone use 
capability and actual use. The use of such propaganda 
has been readily capitalized on by al-Qaida, Hizbol-
lah, Hamas, and IS in their online postings and videos. 
A third form of messaging is to give a warning. This 
is very much akin to the old “shot across the bow,” 
which means that deadly force will likely be used next 
unless the targeted audience accedes to one’s request-
ed demands. Providing a warning to the other side in 
such a manner may also serve as a form of future de-
terrence against unwanted actions. The October 2012 
Hizbollah drone reconnaissance of the Dimona, Israel, 
nuclear weapons complex as well as the propaganda 
component of the July 2014 Hamas drone incident 
(both physical and online) in Ashdod, Israel, that “we 
now, too, have armed drones” were meant to threaten 
Israel for deterrence and behavioral shaping purposes. 
IED Delivery. 
Since pre-July 2001, al-Qaida leaders have been 
musing about using drones equipped with IEDs for 
terrorist attack purposes against Western leaders. Al-
Qaida plots via affinity nodes have also included tar-
geting passenger airliners (June 2002), general testing 
(2006-07), and use against key governmental build-
ings in Washington, DC (September 2011). A Fatah 
plot (December 2002) and one intertwined with Hiz-
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bollah (in August and December 2003), along with an 
actual Hizbollah incident involving explosive payload 
drones (August 2006) shot down before hitting their 
targets, have also been identified. More recently, in 
September 2014, a Hizbollah drone was used to attack 
the al-Nusra Front (an al-Qaida linked group) near 
Arsal in northeastern Lebanon (assumed on the Syrian 
side of the border). In this successful operation—quite 
possibly the first of its kind for a nonstate group—
some 23 al-Nusra fighters in a base were said to be 
killed in the attack that was then followed up by a 
ground assault. It is unknown if the drone was carry-
ing an explosive payload or utilized an air-to-ground 
weapon to destroy the command facility the al-Nusra 
personnel occupied.49 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Delivery. 
The pre-June 1994 attempt by Aum Shinrikyo to 
weaponize a UAV to spray the sarin nerve agent, and 
the alleged pre-February 2002 plot by al-Qaida opera-
tives to release anthrax against the House of Commons 
in London, UK, suggest that this potential drone capa-
bility has long been identified by terrorist groups. The 
delivery of radiological materials by means of a UAV 
would represent another component of such WMD 
capability, though it has not been linked to any known 
terrorist plots. Still, such drone WMD use potentials 
are widely recognized by security analysts: “Drones 
could potentially carry and launch some weapons of 
mass destruction—biological and chemical weapons 
and even radioactive ‘dirty’ bombs.”50 
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Weapons Platform. 
Placing rockets and missiles on drones (to mimic 
far more robust U.S. drone capabilities) represents 
another violent nonstate actor capability that can be 
derived from UAV employment. This trend appears 
to be relatively recent and may be evident in the 
homemade Hamas drone outfitted with small rockets 
under its wings in the July 2014 Ashdod incident. This 
capability may already be possessed by Hizbollah via 
the possible transfer of the armed “Hamaseh” Iranian 
produced drone. Since Hizbollah has already utilized 
a number of other Iranian drone types in the past, it 
takes little imagination to see this new drone ending 
up in Hizbollah’s armory. A photo of this drone was 
taken in May 2013 and serves as a weapons platform 
for two air-to-ground attack munitions.51 Another 
more basic capability—that of placing a firearm on a 
UAV and using it to shoot at a target—has already tak-
en place. This can be seen in an online advertisement 
for smart phone shields in which a pistol attached to a 
drone fires at various items, including a smart phone 
utilizing the advertised product.52 To date, the placing 
of firearms on UAVs has not been tied to any known 
terrorist or insurgent plots or incidents, but the poten-
tials are being discussed in online media.53 
Other UAV Capabilities.
Other UAV capabilities presently existing that 
have not been tied to terrorist and insurgent use or 
plots are:
Smuggling: Since at least 2009, numerous examples 
exist globally of UAVs being used by criminals and 
organized crime to smuggle goods such as narcotics, 
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cigarettes, and cell phones into fixed installations such 
as prisons, and even across national boundaries.54 Re-
ports suggest that one of the major regions in which 
such smuggling has taken place is along the U.S. and 
Mexican border. It is being carried out by the Mexican 
cartels, with well over 100 incidents said to have taken 
place.55 This UAV capability would allow for the rais-
ing of revenues via narcotics smuggling by terrorists 
and insurgents. 
ELINT Capability (Limited): In 2014, a drone was 
created to hack mobile devices specifically by means 
of finding those with open Wi-Fi network connections 
and tricking them into providing data by mimicking 
networks they have accessed in the past. This was 
done by equipping the drone with the Snoopy soft-
ware capability.56 This form of ELINT drone can be 
used for illicit fundraising (eg., bank account access), 
to engage in identity theft in order to compromise 
cyber and physical security systems, and for gain-
ing intelligence against individuals for kidnapping 
purposes. 
Logistical Resupply: The first UAV combat resupply 
took place in December 2011 when a K-Max helicopter 
adapted by Lockheed brought in supplies to a Marine 
base in Afghanistan.57 This program has since contin-
ued and now progressed to where a software applica-
tion (app) is being developed to allow Marines to sum-
mon resupply UAVs via tablets and smart handheld 
devices. The experimental program is funded through 
2018 and, if successful, we could see more widespread 
introduction of this system in the 2020s.58 Such a basic 
UAV resupply capability would mean that frontline 
advancing or besieged insurgent fighters could also 
potentially benefit from food and ammunition sup-
plies being flown into them via modified commercial 
UAV systems.
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Surrender of Opposing Force Personnel: During the 
Gulf War, in late-February 1991, a small group of Iraqi 
troops surrendered to a U.S. Pioneer RQ-2A drone on 
Faylaka Island near Kuwait City rather than face an-
other bombardment of 16-inch shells from the U.S.S. 
Missouri. The low flying drone was being used as a 
spotter via a video link back to the Missouri for tar-
geting and battlefield damage assessment of the de-
fending Iraqi forces.59 This was the first time in his-
tory that a group of soldiers have ever been known 
to surrender to a robot in war. While a terrorist group 
may or may not find such a UAV capability useful, 
it may have utility for an insurgent group that is 
attempting to capture a city. 
Recent technology trends that may bolster UAV 
functionality suggest that the following enabling 
technologies may also influence future terrorist and 
insurgent potential uses.
Smart Glasses and Virtual Reality Goggles: UAVs 
are typically flown using handheld controllers like 
those used for model airplanes, with the pilot observ-
ing the drone from a distance. This form of stand-off 
piloting is functional when the UAV is being flown 
in noncomplex terrain such as in open fields, and to 
a limited extent over urban areas, when pilot line-of-
sight is maintained. An immediate drawback to this 
method of UAV control is pilot perspective—they 
are viewing the drone from afar—which reduces its 
tactical maneuverability and handling. To overcome 
this limitation, hobbyist and commercial UAV pilots 
have taken to using smart glasses (with see-through 
lenses  that have computer imagery projected on 
them) and virtual reality goggles and visors that cre-
ate computer-generated three-dimensional (3D) simu-
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lations of what a drone sees in front of it via a video 
camera system.60 This merges the perspective of the 
stand-off pilot with the UAV—in essence, placing him 
in the drone or allowing him to become the drone (as 
a “virtual martyr”)61 for flight control purposes. The 
end result is that tactical mobility greatly increases as 
can been seen in a clip of drone races through a forest 
in Argonay, France, which was posted on YouTube in 
September 2014 and has been widely viewed.62 
Apps and Modular Payloads: The trend towards 
open architecture systems—“Plug-N-Play”—will 
mean that UAVs can be quickly configured for differ-
ent uses via apps and payload modularity (hardware). 
One off-the-shelf method in this regard is to attach a 
smart phone (eg., iPhone or Galaxy) to a UAV in order 
to gain new forms of functionality for various uses.63 
Novel smart phone apps of interest include GPS fenc-
ing which would designate a limited geographic area 
that a drone could only fly within for patrol or seek-
ing purposes64 and an infrared video attachment that 
would allow a drone to be flown under the cover of 
darkness and also pick up target body heat signa-
tures.65  Payload modularity means that a drone could 
transition from cargo hauling through reconnaissance 
through serving as a weapons platform or as an actual 
aerial IED as required. 
Expert Systems and Artificial Intelligence: One of the 
limitations of UAV use is that the systems have to be 
constantly monitored and controlled by human beings. 
It is expected that expert systems (“if-then statement” 
decision point) and artificial intelligence (scenario 
maximizing) drone controllers will also be employed. 
The mission value is in some ways equivalent to uti-
lizing a wire-guided missile that the operator needs to 
keep on target as opposed to a fire-and-forget weapon 
23
that can be launched and then does not require human 
interaction to guide it to the target. The ability to send 
out an autonomous UAV to complete a simple mission 
already exists—such as for a computer program to fly 
a drone and take some form of basic action.66 The use 
of such semi-independent and independent systems 
would also get around limitations in controller signal 
range—extending drone flying distances—and would 
likely allow for far quicker reaction cycles to chang-
ing operating conditions (e.g., machine decisionmak-
ing and flight corrections are faster than that of hu-
man beings). Additionally, machine based groups and 
swarms of drones can operate together in coordinated 
(intelligent) networks, which is beyond the capability 
of groups of human controlled UAVs.67
3D Printing: Entire UAVs, except for certain motor 
and command and control parts, can now be created 
by 3D printers. The first printed drone parts—in this 
instance, for a model aircraft—were created in 2011 by 
Southhampton University and took a week to print.68 
By 2014, drone components could be printed in less 
than 24 hours, as was done by a Sheffield University 
team.69 Later that year, a military grade fully autono-
mous drone (with an Android phone brain), the Ra-
zor 3, was printed for the MITRE Corporation, a DoD 
contractor, with off-the-shelf parts for $2,500 in just 
over a day by the University of Virginia.70 In tandem 
with these developments is the 3D printing of a fire-
arm, which took place in 2013 based on a primitive de-
sign (the plastic Liberator) while, in November 2013, 
a metal M1911 pistol was printed using an industrial 
3D printer.71 A projected capability to regularly print 
higher strength metal components, in addition to plas-
tic and composite components, is expected once the 
technology to do so becomes economically feasible. 
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This will mean that the 3D printed core components of 
a drone outfitted with various forms of weaponry will 
at some point become a reality. An urban street culture 
video linking 3D printed guns and drones, gangsters, 
narcotics, and violence together should also be noted. 
It can be found in the video, Double Bubble Trouble, 
released by rap singer Mathangi “Maya” Arulpragas-
am, known as M.I.A., in her 2013 album, Matangi.72 
The concern, of course, is that these technology link-
ages are being spread to demographics that may in-
clude disenfranchised Western youth susceptible to 
ongoing terrorist radicalization initiatives. 
POTENTIALS—THREAT SCENARIOS
Transitioning from present baselines of terrorist 
and insurgent use of UAVs, along with technology 
trends influencing their potential uses, three red team-
ing threat scenarios have been created for early warn-
ing purposes: 1) Single UAV—human controlled, 2) 
Groups of UAVs—human controlled or semi-autono-
mous, and 3) Swarms of UAVs—autonomous to high-
light the projected evolution of this weaponry use (See 
Table 2.). Each threat scenario will be discussed, along 
with the expected time frame in which it may take 
place and its probable significance to U.S. national 
security and military operations.
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Table 2. Terrorist and Insurgent UAV  
Use Threat Scenarios.
Threat Scenario 1: Single UAV—Human controlled.
In this threat scenario, a single human controlled 
UAV is utilized in a tactical action for terrorism pur-
poses. Precedent exists for such an incident derived 
from past terrorist plots and activities tied to al-Qaida 
and its wider web of affinity-linked individuals. Such 
a scenario is presently achievable with current off-
the-shelf technologies. Three scenario variants will be 
provided to showcase the diversity of terrorist attacks 
that can be carried out via a single human operated 
UAV.
Drone-up Shooting. 
In this scenario variant, a low and slow flying drone 
is utilized for assassination purposes in order to kill a 
political leader, general officer, or other very impor-
Threat Scenario Time Period Description Significance
1: Single UAV— 
Human Controlled
Present Day Tactical action utilized to create a 
terrorism incident. Scenario variants: 
Drone-up Shooting, IED Crowd Target-
ing, and Aircraft Takedown
Tactical (+Terrorism 
Disruptive Potentials)
2: Group of UAVs— 
Human Controlled 
or Semi-autono-
mous
Present Day
Near Futures 
(Some Years)
Force-on-force engagement in insur-
gency environment. Scenario variants: 
Squad-sized Virtual Martyrs Unit and 
Semi-autonomous Drone Squadron
Operational
3: Swarm of 
UAVs— 
Autonomous
Futures (A Few 
Decades)
Robotic targeting of human personnel, 
materiel, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels 
in conflict and war. Scenario variants: 
Swarms and Micro-Swarms
Strategic
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tant person. Since a firearm was successfully placed 
and fired from a small UAV in 2013; the only differ-
ence this scenario would require is the engagement of 
a human rather than an inanimate object. The require-
ments to conduct this attack would be to determine 
the route and time frame of the targeted individual 
in order to send the drone out to the appropriate out-
side ambush location. A video link can be maintained 
between the operator and drone, and the simple com-
mand of having the trigger of the firearm pulled can 
be sent digitally. A laser pointer can also be added for 
accuracy purposes. 
IED Crowd Targeting. 
The second variant represents an area rather than 
a point target type of drone attack. As in the previ-
ous example, a video link and a simple command—in 
this instance, that of detonation—can be utilized with 
a UAV carrying an IED. The intent would be to have 
the drone fly into a crowd of individuals and detonate 
among them. This would mimic the effects of a terror-
ist grenade or IED attack on a grouping of people. An 
effective use of this form of attack would be to attack 
crowds in a sports stadium or along a parade route in 
order to generate panic and create a stampede and/or 
crowd crush-type situation. Follow-on drones, even if 
unarmed, could be utilized to create the illusion of a 
coordinated attack for terror generation purposes. 
Aircraft Takedown.
Of the three highlighted variants, this one—target-
ing a passenger airliner or military jet or transport—
could be said to best maximize single human operator 
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UAV capabilities. Rather than utilizing a quad or other 
form of slow commercial drone, it would draw upon 
the speed and kinetic ability of hobbyist scale model 
jets. The intent of this form of attack is to simulate a 
“bird strike” on an aircraft engine while an airliner or 
jet aircraft is taking off and most vulnerable to cata-
strophic flight failures.73 Such a UAV strike would be 
far more serious than a bird strike due to superior ki-
netic effects. Model jets can achieve speeds well over 
100 mile per hour and have more mass than birds74 and 
can be augmented with a penetrator rod (composed of 
a metal or composite material) running the length of 
a hobbyist jet.75 As no explosive or form of armament 
would be required for such an attack—other than a 
video link for engine targeting purposes—it would be 
considered a pre-existing off-the-shelf capability.
The significance of this threat scenario (and its vari-
ants) ranges from minimal to low in its implications. 
A drone-up shooting simply represents a variant of 
a political assassination, while IED crowd targeting 
mimics a traditional bombing, both of which can be 
utilized for terrorist (against civilians) and insurgency 
(against police and military) purposes. The difference, 
of course, is a standoff between the perpetrator, i.e., 
the UAV operator, and the UAV being utilized as a 
weapons platform to carry a firearm or as a delivery 
system to carry an IED. The flight ability of a UAV, 
however, may allow it access to venues, such as a 
sports stadium, where an armed human attacker can-
not gain entrance due to security screening protocols.76 
The aircraft takedown variant, however, is different in 
that a human attacker is precluded from gaining ac-
cess to an aircraft during takeoff due to both airport 
and airbase security and the fact the aircraft is in its 
initial flight stage. This means that utilizing a drone to 
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engage in such an attack represents a new capability 
that can be directed against civilian airliners for ter-
rorism purposes within the continental United States 
(CONUS) and against military aircraft for insurgency 
purposes   outside CONUS deployed areas.77 Ultimate-
ly, however, all of these scenario variants leverage the 
disruptive potentials terrorism has to offer and, while 
based upon tactical actions, should be considered ter-
rorist attacks first and foremost in their effects.
Threat Scenario 2: Group of UAVs— 
Human Controlled or Semi-autonomous.
No groups of UAVs have as of yet been utilized 
together in a conflict setting by violent nonstate ac-
tors, such as terrorists or insurgents, so no historical 
precedent for this threat scenario exists. Rather, it is 
based on a linear trend projection derived from hob-
byist racing for human controlled UAVs and com-
mercial applications derived from various apps being 
integrated into semi-autonomous drone systems. The 
first variant, based on the virtual martyrs concept,78 
pertaining to this threat scenario is viewed as a cur-
rent capability (which may or may not be exploited by 
Jihadist insurgent groups), while the second variant, 
highlighting the use of a group of semi-autonomous 
drones, is expected to become technically feasible in 
the near future. These scenario variants include the 
following. 
Squad-sized Virtual Martyrs Unit. 
This is a squad-sized UAV unit composed of racing 
drones outfitted with IEDs controlled by virtual real-
ity linked human controllers. The intent of this unit is 
to attack U.S. and allied soldiers and security person-
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nel by detonating the IED drones once they come into 
the proximity of their targets. A sub-variant of such 
drones would be ones outfitted with either shaped 
charges or explosively formed projectiles (EFP) that 
would be utilized for the precision targeting of U.S. 
and allied armored vehicles.79 Inhibitors to the use of 
such virtual martyr drones include video feed and 
controller communication range limitations, signal 
dead zones, short drone battery life, and IED weight 
restrictions. This unit can be utilized in a stand-alone 
mode with only virtually controlled IED carrying 
drones involved or in a combined arms fashion as ad 
hoc support to human insurgent fighters and/or inte-
grated with a semi-autonomous drone squadron. 
 Semi-autonomous Drone Squadron. 
Such a squadron represents a small grouping of 
drones launched together in an assault wave. It would 
draw upon both the drone-up shooting (firearm car-
ried) and IED crowd targeting (bomb carried) single 
UAV scenarios, with the addition of autonomous 
drone capability. The drones can be sent against po-
lice and military personnel located at a GPS coordi-
nate. The drones would be provided with GPS fencing 
instructions to patrol within certain physical bound-
aries and engage (via weapons firing or IED detona-
tion) humans and/or moving objects that they come 
across using human form or motion sensors. Human 
controllers have the option of taking over individual 
drones for engagement purposes as required. An am-
bush variant of this scenario variant would be to have 
these UAVs resting in a “drone nest” (essentially a box 
buried at ground level) that would open when oppos-
ing troops lacking identification friend or foe tags trip 
sensors during entry into an area. 
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This scenario and its variants are not about creat-
ing terror per se—which may still occur as a second-
ary outcome—but instead focus on the generation of 
combat power in force-on-force engagements found 
in insurgency environments.80 As a result, the direct 
implications of this scenario are at the military op-
erational level in which groups of drones serve as 
a) physical avatars for humans virtually controlling 
them, or b) machine soldiers controlled by expert sys-
tems, both of which directly engage human soldiers in 
combat. This scenario is thus meant to be reflective of 
the changing patterns of conflict and war in which the 
5th dimension of cyberspace (via physical space-time 
manipulation)81 and unmanned systems are beginning 
to increasingly influence operations.82 The significance 
of this scenario would likely be limited in scope ini-
tially with increasing importance up to a moderate 
level of threat represented by the semi-autonomous 
drone variant when (or if) it is realized.83
Threat Scenario 3: Swarm of UAVs—Autonomous.
While this threat scenario may sound like some-
thing from a science fiction novel, the technologies that 
would allow swarms of autonomous drones to operate 
on the future battlefield are already being developed. 
One experiment in this regard is being conducted by 
Hungarian civilian researchers with the COLLMOT 
Robotic Research Project who have “created 10 drones 
that self-organize as they move through the air.”84 In 
one example, these drones overcome an obstacle by 
maneuvering in line through a choke point. While 
the researchers strive that this experimentation is for 
peaceful pursuits, the military benefits of increas-
ingly larger groups of drones that can self-organize in 
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order to fulfill mission requirements is readily appar-
ent. Similar experimentation is ongoing with U.S. Of-
fice of Naval Research experiments, which are pres-
ently up to 13 autonomous and remote controlled 
swarming robot boats. As for the desired project coun-
terterrorism end state, “The Navy officials envision 
swarms of unmanned surface vehicles . . . being used 
to form a defensive perimeter around larger ships and 
to surround enemy ships.”85 Based on this projected 
threat scenario, two variants, utilizing swarms of 
normal and micro-sized drones, are foreseen.
Drone Swarms.
The full-sized autonomous UAVs incorporated 
into this scenario variant are meant to destroy major 
elements of U.S. power such as the military aircraft 
situated at an air base, the armored vehicles belong-
ing to a brigade combat team, or a major capital ship 
such as an aircraft carrier. A massive drone swarm—
with each semi-intelligent drone networked together 
and outfitted with an explosive warhead—would be 
launched against such military targets in this scenario 
variant. In the case of the targeting of an aircraft car-
rier, this eventual threat may be considered equiva-
lent in scale to the sinking of captured German battle-
ship Ostfriesland in July 1921 by U.S. Army Air Service 
aircraft under the command of Brigadier General 
William “Billy” Mitchell. This experiment helped to 
prove that aircraft carriers would eventually eclipse 
battleships as the principle capital ship of navy forces 
and suggests, in the present case of drone swarm po-
tentials, that some sort of stealthy drone carriers may 
at some point eclipse aircraft carriers as major surface 
naval combatants.
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Micro-drone Swarms.
The micro-drones that form the basis of this threat 
scenario variant are meant to be utilized for anti-per-
sonnel rather than anti-materiel purposes. Such UAVs 
range in size from small flying insects to that of palm-
sized devices equivalent in size to small birds.86 Such 
micro-UAVs  can be outfitted with a host of traditional 
weapons—small guns and explosives—as well as un-
conventional armaments such as incapacitators, poi-
sons, and nerve agents.87 In this scenario variant, these 
devices would be intended for urban terrain with the 
micro-swarms utilized against opposing U.S. soldiers.
Of concern is the Anti-Access/Area Denial potentials 
of such projected micro-drone swarms; however, these 
UAVs are presently far too sophisticated for insurgent 
groups to develop, much less field.
It is assumed that over time the dozen or so autono-
mous drones that can presently self-organize will con-
tinue to increase in size into larger and larger group-
ings. At what point a large enough grouping of drones 
technically becomes a “swarm” is undefined. From a 
biological perspective, honeybee swarms range from 
a few thousand bees into the low tens of thousands. 
As an arbitrary threshold, real drone swarms might 
therefore be said to require at least a thousand or so 
individual UAVs. The operational fielding of such 
swarms on the battlefield may be viable within 2 de-
cades.88 While the threat represented by a few hun-
dred weaponized drones is significant, thousands of 
autonomous self-organizing UAVs operating on the 
battlefield would have immense U.S. national security 
implications. 
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It should be noted, however, that the futures rep-
resented by Threat Scenario 3 may or may not be be-
yond the capability of a terrorist or insurgent group 
devoid of state or multinational sponsorship. As a 
result, this capability from a threats perspective may 
only be available to advanced states such as China or 
Russia, technologically sophisticated multinational 
corporation equivalent powers, or their terrorist or 
insurgent proxies.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS AND
POLICY RESPONSE
Derived from the UAV use threat scenarios, three 
levels of military significance are foreseen with terror-
ist and insurgent activities associated with these de-
vices. Because of the technologies that will eventually 
be associated with UAVs—robotics and expert (and 
artificial intelligence) systems networked together—
their significance is projected to increase over time 
from the tactical to the operational and then to the 
strategic levels of concern. These levels of military im-
plication and the suggested policy responses related 
to them follow. 
Tactical.
The impact of even singular terrorist UAV use at 
this level is viewed as an immediate- and near-term 
problem. It may represent more of a domestic security 
issue than an overseas basing or deployment threat—
although such weaponized devices could just as eas-
ily be utilized for terrorism purposes overseas against 
service personnel and their families as they could be 
used against civilians in the United States. The tactical 
34
level threat derived from the drone-up shooting, IED 
crowd targeting, and aircraft takedown scenario vari-
ants will be of concern to domestic law enforcement, 
homeland security, and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
elements. 
For the U.S. Army, the tactical implications of such 
UAV use will fall within force protection, counterter-
rorism, and defense support of civil authorities’ mis-
sions. It will focus on UAV detection, countermeasures, 
and tactical response. Like civilian law enforcement, 
the Army will be required to generate new capabilities 
to mitigate this potential threat. Such response may be 
as simple as utilizing shotguns in a skeet shooting role 
that substitute a hostile UAV for a clay disk and/or 
the inclusion of slightly more involved shotgun am-
munition modifications such as less-lethal rounds (eg., 
baton or multiple-impact with wire lines) for use in 
urban environments. Stringing up wires to stop access 
into open venues or in flight choke points may prove 
to be other hasty anti-drone protocols that may need 
to be considered if hostile UAV use becomes evident 
in an area of operations. More advanced measures 
being considered by the Army in this regard include 
a new Barrett 25 millimeter anti-drone rifle that has 
been developed, and electronic warfare systems that 
had initially been created for counter-IED use, while 
the Marine Corps is developing a vehicle mounted 
high power laser.89 
Since such UAV threat potentials represent a com-
mon problem for local, state, and federal law enforce-
ment as well as the Army and other services, it would 
be prudent for such groups and agencies to form joint 
working groups to address the tactical concerns such 
terrorist use could pose. Allied military and federal 
policing bodies, such as those belonging to Canada, 
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should be considered for inclusion in such working 
groups. Additionally, from an Army perspective, the 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point might 
represent a natural choice to track ongoing terrorist 
and insurgent UAV interest and use while the vari-
ous branch bulletins (e.g., Infantry and Military Police) 
could promote UAV countermeasures and response 
thinking.
Operational.
This level of impact is insurgency environment fo-
cused and pertains to the use of groups of human con-
trolled and semi-autonomous UAVs. The virtual mar-
tyrs and drone squadron scenario variants portrayed 
the various types of flying IED, weapons platform, 
and human insurgent fighter combined arms hybrid 
threats that could be encountered at this level of con-
cern. While conceivably representing a present-day 
operational risk scenario as the technologies exist for 
insurgents to utilize UAVs in this way, this is much 
more likely a near futures issue that could still be 
some years out on the horizon before nonstate oppos-
ing forces even contemplate or attempt such attacks. 
Since no terrorism component is readily foreseen 
but rather force-on-force engagements are being fo-
cused upon, this is not viewed as a domestic law en-
forcement and homeland security concern. Rather, it 
is an Army and allied services expeditionary concern, 
bridging the tactical into the operational level of im-
pact. This means that experimentation and red team-
ing is warranted related to threat forces use of UAVs 
in insurgency type environments. Small scale exercises 
in which red team virtual martyr and drone squadron 
groups (utilizing UAVs containing paintball grenades 
and simulated small arms firing) are pitted against 
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Army infantry squads and platoons (also armed with 
marking rounds). These exercises are advocated for 
threat baseline and projection determination purposes. 
Competitions between Army personnel with the tech-
nical skills to create such commercial threat system 
based quads and related drone systems and the devel-
opment of the red team concepts to utilize them oper-
ationally should also be considered to support such an 
effort.
Given the foreseen impact at the operational level, 
the Army effort to develop such small scale UAV red 
team exercises might best be initially coordinated via 
programs at the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and supported 
by writings meant to generate awareness, discussion, 
and debate at the Military Review level of professional 
writing.90 Given ongoing U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School interest in UAV experimentation, a liaison to 
their programs should also be established. Ultimate-
ly, the limited scale red teaming exercises advocated 
could be held at any number of Army training ven-
ues such as the National Training Center at Fort Ir-
win, CA, or the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, 
Butterville, IN.91 
Strategic.
While the drone swarms of normal and micro-sized 
UAVs projected in this threat scenario may still be a 
few decades out, and possibly even beyond the capac-
ity of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on their own 
without state sponsorship, now is the time to attempt 
to get ahead of such developments and help shape the 
future combat environment.92 At a minimum, we may 
presently be in an inter-war period, as experienced 
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between World Wars I and II, when the various ele-
ments leading to a revolution in military affairs took 
place with the evolution of the tank and supporting 
arms that resulted in the mass armor and mechanized 
formations that fought in World War II. In this in-
stance, similar disparate elements, involving robot-
ics, expert systems, artificial and collective (cloud-like 
based) intelligence, network communications, and 3D 
and 4D replicators may be ushering in another revolu-
tion in land warfare involving both ground and aerial 
based unmanned vehicles and systems. 
Given the strategic impact potentials of such aerial 
(and ground) drone swarms on the future conduct of 
war, research and writing is required to be vested at 
the U.S. Army War College level of analysis and pol-
icy formulation. Papers derivative from this present 
effort and earlier ones are needed, as well as shorter 
essays written for Parameters, to highlight concerns, 
debates, and insights related to robot autonomy and 
Landpower.93 Considerations need to be made con-
cerning arms control regimes related to such autono-
mous, intelligent, and lethal robotic systems94 as well 
as their integration with human soldiers into future 
force structures if that Army unit composition is elect-
ed to be followed, as presently appears to be the na-
tional trajectory. Further, given the Joint Force nature 
of American warfighting, the debate on such autono-
mous robotic systems and drone swarms needs to be 
expanded to the other senior service war colleges as 
well as equivalent level allied nation defense educa-
tional institutions.95 
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